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larity that Mulgan correctly fears avoided for
a moderate consequentialism, including, in
part, an ideal code? 
Thirdly, RC gives weight to our psychological
make-up in attempting to identify the ideal
code. It seems plausible that people could
have a disposition towards complete theories,
or at least, the veneer of completeness. If
people prefer a theory that suggests it can ac-
count for everything this may undermine
Mulgan’s view of RC. His astute discussion of
risk and uncertainty argues that their interre-
lated eﬀect “justifies the Rule Consequentia-
list reluctance to seek more detailed moral
conclusions than the complexity of the sub-
ject matter permits” (p. 254). Yet how can this
be balanced with the possibility that people
may desire not only “more detailed moral
conclusions” but the appearance of a theory
with all the answers. Giving the false impres-
sion of completeness may not be a problem
for Mulgan’s RC if it could be shown to lead
to better results: “transparency [is] not neces-
sarily a virtue” (p. 155). At times Mulgan
seems to be advocating an esoteric morality
in the vein of Sidgwick who himself said: “. .
. on Utilitarian principles, it may be right to
do and privately recommend, under certain
circumstances, what it would not be right to
advocate openly; it may be right to teach
openly to one set of persons what it would be
wrong to teach to others; it may be conceiva-
bly right to do, if it can be done with com-
parative secrecy, what it would be wrong to
do in the face of the world; and even, if per-
fect secrecy can be reasonably expected, what
it would be wrong to recommend by private
advice and example” (1907, p. 489). If this is
Mulgan’s view, he certainly departs from
Hooker’s (2002, p. 85) perspective of RC:
“Such paternalistic duplicity would be mo-
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rally wrong, even if it would maximize the ag-
gregate good.” Mulgan, at least in this book,
seems not to have oﬀered us protection from
the Noble Lie.
Lastly, Mulgan admits that the Realm of Ne-
cessity and the Realm of Reciprocity are not
strictly separated: “The boundaries between
moral realms are fluid...Any attempt to sepa-
rate the two realms neatly and completely is
bound to be an oversimplification” (p. 346).
Accepting this, one may still query the nature
of the division. We are told that RC is appli-
cable in the Realm of Reciprocity, which pre-
vails between members of a moral
community whereby “the notion of moral
community...is of a society of comparatively
equal moral agents who can interact in mu-
tually advantageous ways in pursuit of their
goals” (p. 343). It seems to me the ideal moral
code that RC would promote must include
rules for distinguishing between those who
can be considered part of my moral commu-
nity and those who are not: One must know
how to make this distinction in order to ap-
propriately learn and apply the code. Hence
the division of realms of morality itself must
be acceptable as part of the code. The need to
teach to people that there are two realms of
morality as a result of two kinds of lives may
be prohibitively costly for the code.
These issues aside, in Future People we have a
solid piece of philosophical analysis which in-
vigorates the debate on intergenerational ju-
stice by bringing a long needed robust
consequentialist perspective on this topic.
Moreover, Mulgan shows that the issue of in-
tergenerational justice has important impli-
cations for public policy and the nature of
morality itself. His work should take centre
stage in further scholarship in this area.
Tim Mulgan (2006) Future People. A Mode-
rate Consequentialist Account of our Obligati-
ons to Future Generations. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 384 pages. ISBN: 0-19-
929220-X. Price £13.25
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ichard P. Hiskes is based at the
University of Connecticut as a pro-
fessor of political theory, some one
thousand five hundred miles from the BP oil
disaster site that began to haemorrhage on
April 20th, 2010. Despite the distance, it
seems fair to assume that the political im-
plications of the slick black tide have drifted
north as far as the Nutmeg State. In the in-
troduction of his book, The Human Right to
a Green Future – Environmental Rights and
Intergenerational Justice, Hiskes pre-empts
the frustration Americans now feel in trying
to hold the fourth largest company in the
world to account:  “Environmentalism
needs a new and more muscular political vo-
cabulary grounded in today’s central politi-
cal ideas of human rights and justice” (p. 2). 
Consequently, Hiskes moves to develop a ju-
stification for environmental human rights,
which he understands as the foundation for
intergenerational environmental justice.
This is, as he himself acknowledges, an ar-
R
55
duous task: environmental rights have often
been seen as rights of less importance, parti-
cularly in comparison to first generation civil
and political rights; such human rights may
be incompatible with other rights; environ-
mental human rights are deemed unable to
handle the conflict between universalism
and particularism. Trying to establish rights
for future generations has equally troubling
problems, most notably, their reliance on
controversial collective rights and the una-
voidable diﬃculty of reciprocity, or the lack
thereof, between present and distant future
peoples.
Cognisant of these threats to any attempt to
give a rights-based vision of intergeneratio-
nal environmental justice, Hiskes’ main en-
deavour is to argue for three concomitant
standpoints: Emergent Environmental
Human Rights, Communitarianism and Re-
flexive Reciprocity. The common thread
through these three is the way in which we
understand the formation of human iden-
tity. As he is well aware, this is a dangerous
move as identity politics has been a quag-
mire of philosophical unclarity, arguably be-
cause many of us do not have the solid sense
of identity that theory often suggests we
have. Nevertheless, Hiskes hopes that this
approach will lead to a global consensus on
intergenerational environmental justice.
More specifically, this theoretical harvest
bow is to ground an entitlement to clean air,
water and soil, themselves chosen simply be-
cause “it is hard to imagine any rights more
basic either to life or to all other rights than
the rights to clean air, water, and soil” (p.
39). In order to fashion this, he weaves to-
gether a vast array of arguments from other
authors. Unfortunately, the sheer number of
positions in a book of this size cannot give
each suﬃcient substance. The result is that
nuances of individual authors melt away.
Nevertheless, this need not be the sole de-
terminant of the book’s value.
Looking to human rights to protect us now,
posterity and our environment is testament
to the perennial appeal of the natural rights
tradition of the seventeenth century. As
Margaret MacDonald (in Waldron, 1984, p.
21) put it: “[The claim to ‘Natural Rights’]
tends in some form to be renewed in every
crisis in human aﬀairs, when the plain citi-
zen tries to make, or expects his leaders to
make, articulate his obscure, but firmly held
conviction that he is not a mere pawn in any
political game, nor the property of any go-
vernment or rule, but the living and prote-
sting individual for whose sake all political
games are played and all governments insti-
tuted.” However, Hiskes wants to suggest
that the ‘emergent’, or relational, character
of rights enhances the intuitions of the na-
tural rights tradition, which holds that from
the firm, unchanging foundation of our
human nature arises our eternal and ina-
lienable rights. 
Crucially, Hiskes views our own understan-
ding of ‘human nature’ as having changed
dramatically. He claims there has been a
move away from conceiving the individuali-
stic frenzied state of nature context as the
source of natural rights. Instead, at the heart
of human rights theory is a greater concern
for the recognition and protection of human
dignity as exemplified in Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
“All human beings are born free and equal
in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act
towards one another in a spirit of brother-
hood” (p. 31). For Hiskes, the implication
of this change over the course of four hun-
dred years is to see that human rights are
constituted by the social relations that faci-
litate conscience and dignity. This revitali-
sed conception of ‘human nature’ follows
the relatively recent work of Gilligan, Kri-
steva, Foucault, Taylor and Habermas. In
these disparate thinkers’ work Hiskes sees a
common eﬀect: the increased ack-
nowledgment of the relational impact on
our sense of human identity. What it means
to be human, to fulfil the criteria necessary
to be able to hold human rights, is formed in
our interaction with others. It is not in iso-
lation from society.  For the author it is clear
that rights are emergent when we consider
that human rights surface in concert with
the types of harms that pertain at a particu-
lar time when society is at a certain techno-
logical level: “Environmental rights are
human rights that have ‘emerged’ in a parti-
cular point in human history as the direct
result of the growth of human interconnec-
tions” (p. 40). The distinct character of en-
vironmental human rights results from
Hiskes’ alleged fact that the most significant
aspects of our natural environment shape
and mould our interactions with each other
and thus our self-understanding. 
The duties that must correspond to such
emergent rights require a very particular al-
location of responsibility. In consideration
of environmental harms we must employ
collective responsibility among actors and
defer from what he refers to as “strict causa-
lity” (p. 44). Collective responsibility mate-
rializes where there is the willing acceptance
of benefits within a group we are a part of,
and if the potential for serious harm is the
result of accumulated and coordinated indi-
vidual activities each of which may not, in
and of themselves, constitute a harm. Ho-
wever, by enclosing responsibility within a
moral community, Hiskes may be neglecting
the significance of new types of transnatio-
nal politico-economic actors. 
Arguably, the centre-piece of Hiskes’ book is
his idea of reflexive reciprocity. A long tra-
dition in political philosophy has viewed re-
ciprocity as defining the cases in which
justice is applicable or not. At least as far
back as Epicurus, a strong line of thought
has proposed that where the possibility of re-
sponse to another’s actions, at least the ca-
pacity to return like for like, is absent so too
is the notion of justice. This has led some
theorists to view some humans and all non-
human animals as beyond the bounds of ju-
stice. Likewise, a future generation has,
prima facie, no recourse to react in any way
to the actions of non-overlapping previous
generations. Consequently, to defend the
plausibility of intergenerational justice theo-
rists have had to deny reciprocity as a neces-
sary requirement of justice or illustrate that
justice does pertain because there is a reci-
procal relationship between non-overlap-
ping generations. Those who have taken the
former road have had to challenge the
weight of, most notably, the contractualist
tradition. On the other hand, some have
tried to oﬀer suggestions for the grounding
of such reciprocity, for example the ability
to tarnish or reify the memory of previous
generations.
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Hiskes undertakes a mixture of both. To
begin with he criticises an overemphasis on
individualism in the tit-for-tat economic re-
ciprocity attributed to Rawls and Gauthier
and the asocial virtue ethics perspective re-
presented by the work of Lawrence C. Bek-
ker. With this in mind, Hiskes presents his
idea of reflexive reciprocity. The author ar-
gues that the environmental interests of pre-
sent generations are shared with those of
later generations and that the protection of
the latter is symbiotic with the guarding of
the former. A crucial, albeit long, quote il-
lustrates the point: “Consider then that
these are interests [to have clean air, water
and soil] that by their very nature unite pre-
sent and future in important ways. They
exist, as it were, simultaneously now and in
the future in one and the same time (...) We
cannot protect the future’s interests in envi-
ronmental quality without simultaneously
also protecting our own, and we cannot pro-
tect our own without protecting the future’s.
Our action therefore in protecting those in-
terests is not only a duty to the future but
also reverberates back on our own interests
to protect them. In other words, if we re-
cognise the environmental interests of the
future as actual interests that we also share
as equally basic to us, then our protection of
them reciprocally protects our own interests”
(p. 59-60). Again invoking the importance
of the community in identity formation,
Hiskes claims that human identity is formed
in the community and this communal un-
derstanding of ourselves depends in part on
future generations. Borrowing from De Sha-
lit, Hiskes notes that communal self-iden-
tity involves daily interpersonal interaction,
cultural interaction and moral similarity.
While a present generation is incapable of
satisfying the first two conditions with di-
stant future generations, Hiskes concurs
with De Shalit that it does in the case of the
third: “part of what is shared within a stron-
gly communal association is a sense of col-
lective identity, an identity that can be
‘constitutive’ of individual identity as a
member if it includes consideration of fu-
ture members” (p. 66). Moreover, it is again
the environment that takes a pre-eminent
position as “our natural environment is the
singular physical manifestation of our con-
nectedness both with our contemporaries
and also with those who in their future will
inherit our space, our land, our water, and
soil” (p. 66). Reciprocal relations between
those of the same moral community are,
thus, possible given that “we depend on
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their environmental human rights to make
as strong a case as possible for our own; that,
it seems to me, is a degree of interconnec-
tion that makes our reciprocal dependence
clear, and intergenerational environmental
justice possible” (p. 66).
Having suggested that whatever foundations
that may exist are found in the changeable
currents of human communal interaction, it
may appear that Hiskes is diving in for rights
particularism and abandoning universalist
principles. However, Hiskes rejects the in-
clination to consider the global/local dicho-
tomy as a zero sum game and tries to
integrate the robustness of the former with
the reasonableness of the latter. Therefore,
on the one hand he states “...we are entitled
morally to be more concerned with the rights
of some future persons than with those of
others, and that our preferred future subjects
are the future generations of our own moral
community” (p. 73). This is defended on the
grounds that those within one’s community
are especially vulnerable to one’s actions. Ne-
vertheless, this does not permit full scale
local bias because the “moral bindingness of
vulnerability” is not absolute (p. 81).  His-
kes’ use of Goodin’s thesis on vulnerability
is an interesting one but it does not sit easily
with the distinct nature of the environmen-
tal harms he warned of us earlier. The signi-
ficance of these new technologies is precisely
because they make us vulnerable to activities
beyond our borders, moral or geopolitical,
to an unprecedented degree. If local vulne-
rability is strong enough to prioritise local
moral concern, even if not entirely, this
seems enough to undercut the claim of di-
stinct environmental human rights.
Hiskes envisages the most appropriate and
coherent conceptualisation of the moral
community as the nation. Why not the reli-
gious group, the sports team or the company
as our moral community? There is a prag-
matic and theoretical justification of seeing
it as the most appropriate category to bol-
ster a human right to a clean environment.
The nation(-state) is the best equipped en-
tity to act as the addresse of human rights
because human rights are “creatures of na-
tional governments” being “both protected
and potentially violated at that level” (p. 70).
The more developed argument oﬀered by
Hiskes leans on J.S. Mill and Rawls to
ground a nation focus on a communally
held concept of identity and the special ob-
ligations arising out of shared citizenship (p.
83). Hiskes argues, following Yael Tamir and
David Miller, that the legitimate fears
around extreme nationalism have inhibited
a realistic account of the morally obligating
features of a milder form, which could be pi-
votal in securing environmental human
rights. In circumventing the chance of en-
couraging intolerant government through
support of nationalism, Hiskes presents de-
mocracy as a crucial balancing mechanism
(p. 84). Consequently, tempered national-
ism can “provide the communal ties that
both elevate concern for one’s compatriots
to the level of moral obligation without at
the same time moving the community to-
ward totalitarian commitment” (p. 86). Yet
placing such emphasis on the nation state is
certainly questionable. Many social activists
may claim that the state as arbitrator of our
human rights is only possible because, and
not in spite, of supranational enforcement
mechanisms.
How should the nation act to protect such
rights? Constitutional provisions, more spe-
cifically the incorporation into every natio-
nal constitution of the environmental
human right to clean air, water and soil, are
the strongest option (p. 126). Their legal
clout, coordinative guidance and capacity to
“restrain actions by narrow (or narrow-min-
ded) majorities that might be deleterious to
long-term environmental protection…” are
all powerful reasons in favour of using con-
stitutions to defend such human rights (p.
132). Building these environmental human
rights into constitutions not only helps
guard substantive rights but also supports
procedural ones to ensure freedom of infor-
mation and the right to participate in deci-
sion-making around the environment (p.
133). As such, this option reinforces the very
grounds for a human right to a healthy en-
vironment, our democratic communal iden-
tity: “democratic politics turns nations into
communities and deliver the citizens into a
shared realm of meaning within which free-
dom is possible” (p. 90). It is as a result of
this freedom that our moral obligations
emerge feeding our sense of self in a com-
munity. A virtuous circle.
How strong is this argument of Hiskes?
First, Hiskes has defended that constitutio-
nal provisions are appropriate but, crucially,
their content would still require filling in.
Also, it is unsure why he places such faith in
participatory democracy to respect the envi-
ronment. Why should we expect greater
civic participation to lead to greater protec-
tion of our environment for present and/or
future generations? Our notorious discoun-
ting of the future could be seen as a reason
Intergenerational Justice Review
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to avoid such means of protecting our water,
air and soil. 
The homogeneity of ‘community’ through
time is likewise problematic. The Interna-
tional Organisation of Migration (2010)
estimates that there were some two hundred
and fourteen million migrants in the world
in 2010 and this reflects a sharp increase
even since the 1980’s to include all regions
of the world. Take a more specific example;
since the late 1990’s, a natural increase has
been bolstered by a net international migra-
tion into the UK from abroad. Between
2001 and 2004, almost two thirds of the in-
crease in population in the UK was due to
net in-migration (UK National Statistics,
2005 (a)). By the period 2028-2033 the
UK’s increase in population, an estimated
1.8 million, will be 50:50 concerning net
migration to natural increase (UK National
Statistics, 2009). In 2001, 4.9 million (8.3
per cent) of the total population of the UK
were born overseas. This is more than dou-
ble the 2.1 million (4.2 per cent) in 1951
(UK National Statistics, 2005 (b)). Hence,
when we are imagining the members of our
future nation, who are we thinking of? It
cannot only be my, or my neighbours’, great
great grand children. Maybe the future
members of my community will be the po-
sterity of the current citizens of very distant
countries. If this is accepted, on Hiskes’ fra-
mework, then I should be substantially con-
cerned with the environmental human
rights of those other communities. Yet how
am I supposed to know which one(s)?
Should I attend to the empirical facts and
scientific projections? Should I direct my
energies to those who are morally like-min-
ded today, or likely to be tomorrow? Indeed,
how far forward should one envisage? The
main point is that, unless one wishes to ad-
vocate very tight migration policies, the
moral community I conceive of as my future
one is unlikely to be made up of people from
my moral community today. This would un-
dermine my authority to justify showing
greater concern for those with whom I have
direct interconnections in the present.
A second point of concern revolves around
the nature of the rights that we are left with
following this complex theoretical endea-
vour. Even though Hiskes suggests that we
have moved from a natural rights perspec-
tive, what we get from this communal iden-
tity foundation are three biological
needs-based rights, that is, a right to clean
air, water and soil. Admittedly, he provides
for a set of accompanying procedural rights
but we must be careful when justifying the
law that it is suﬃciently motivating. It may
be that in this case there can be greater in-
tuitive appeal to our universally shared bio-
logical need for clean air, water and soil.
Lastly, flaring, the burning of gas released as
a by-product of oil exploration, in Nigeria
results in severe health eﬀects for nearby in-
habitants and serious environmental damage
both locally and globally. The abhorrent
Deepwater Horizon oil disaster has received
extensive mainstream media concern. Fla-
ring has not. Hiskes has provided a clear and
important book grounding a human right
to a healthy environment in communal na-
tional identity. He has certainly avoided the
chauvinistic excesses people often fear in na-
tionalism. Moreover, he details an argument
that will, undoubtedly, be influential for
scholars and activists in their eﬀorts towards
achieving recognition of environmental
human rights. However, I am still drawn by
the intuition that our national biases, both
for our own particular nation and certain
other ones, while likely representing some
natural tendency in human beings, is, ne-
vertheless, appropriately labelled a moral fai-
ling. I fear his theory might not be able to
fully provide for this intuition.
Richard P. Hiskes (2009): The Human Right
to a Green Future. Environmental Rights and
Intergenerational Justice. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 171 pages. ISBN:
978-0-521-87395-6. Price £45.00
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Upcoming Conference: What type of legal
responsibility towards future generations?
Universities of Versailles and Poitiers are
 organizing a colloquium about legal respon-
sibility towards future generations on De-
cember 10th and 13th, 2010.
At present, there are no existing constitutio-
nal or legal mechanisms to hold present ge-
nerations liable before a court of law for da-
mage caused to future generations.
Certain scientific disciplines have theorized
the responsibility of present generations to-
wards future generations: Philosophy, Eco-
nomics, Sociology, Bioethics, etc, but not
Law. There are a number of obstacles to im-
plementing legal responsibility which will
have to be overcome: 
- What type of fault can be held against the
present generations, while recognising their
right to their share of hedonism?
- What type of damage can be taken into ac-
count, bearing in mind that if current law
allows the compensation of future damage
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Announcements and Interna
